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1 Introduction
Climate change has strong distributional e¤ects. The expected consequences for
potential crop yields and the likelihood of ooding or droughts di¤er across re-
gions, and the most detrimental e¤ects are expected to occur in poorer regions.
Negative health and mortality e¤ects also a¤ect developing countries dispro-
portionately. Thus, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concludes,
The e¤ects of climate change are expected to be greatest in developing coun-
tries in terms of loss of life and relative e¤ects on investment and the economy
(IPCC, 2001, p. 8). The severity of these negative e¤ects of climate change in
poor regions is compounded by the fact that The ability of human systems to
adapt to and cope with climate change depends on such factors as wealth, tech-
nology, education, information, skills, infrastructure, access to resources, and
management capabilities. Because endowments of these factors are typically
lower in developing countries, poorer regions also have lesser capacity to adapt
and are, therefore, more vulnerable to climate change damages(p. 8).
The uneven distribution of costs and benets is not unique to environmental
change and environmental policy. Policy generally benets some people while
others are hurt, and Pareto rankings of the outcomes are typically not available.
Instead, decisions have to be based on social welfare evaluations that make
(implicit or explicit) interpersonal comparisons, weighing up costs and benets
so as to arrive at a net result. A standard approach in the economic literature
uses the utility function of a representative agentas a social welfare function.
In the climate literature, the main debates have centered on the choice of dis-
count rates.1 The Stern Review (Stern 2006) adopted a prescriptiveapproach
and argued that on ethical grounds the pure discount rate in the welfare function
should be close to zero. Nordhaus (2008) and most other studies by contrast
use a descriptiveapproach in which the welfare function of the representative
agent has to be calibrated to t empirical observations.2 This approach, Nord-
haus argues, "does not make a case for the social desirability of the distribution
of incomes over space or time under existing conditions". Instead, using the
descriptive approach
The calculations of changes in world welfare arising from e¢ cient
climate-change policies examine potential improvements within the
context of the existing distribution of income and investments across
space and time. (Nordhaus, 2008, p. 174-175)
Assuming that aggregate outcomes can be described consistently by a rep-
resentative agent, it may seem reasonable to use this agents preferences to
measure social welfare. This approach has the appearance of neutrality and
objectivity. The analyst does not impose her own preferences but merely takes
1E.g. Chichilnisky (1996), Dasgupta (2011), Davis and Skott (2011), Rezai et al. (2011),
Roemer (2011), Stern (2008), Weitzman (2009).
2The prescriptive/descriptive terminology is used by Arrow at al. (IPCC chapter 4,
1996).
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as given the revealed preferences of the population. Weitzman makes this ar-
gument explicitly. Like Nordhaus, he rejects the prescriptive approach of the
Stern Review, arguing that:
economists understand the di¤erence between their own personal
preferences for apples over oranges and the preferences of others for
apples over oranges. Inferring societys revealed preference ... is
not an easy task in any event ... but at least a good-faith e¤ort
at such an inference might have gone some way towards convincing
the public that the economists doing the studies are not drawing
conclusions primarily from imposing their own value judgments on
the rest of the world. (Weitzman 2007, p. 712)
According to Weitzman, Nordhauss "careful pragmatic modeling throughout
his DICE series of IAMs has long set the standard in this area" (p. 713).3
The use of descriptive representative-agent models is not conned to the
climate literature. Models of this kind have been the workhorses of macro-
economics since the Lucas revolution of the late 1970s. The explicit welfare
criterion is seen as a strength of the models. Woodford (2003, p. 12; empha-
sis added), for instance, suggests that the utility function of the representative
agent "provides a natural objective in terms of which alternative policies should
be evaluated", while, according to Blanchard (2008, p. 9, emphasis added),
contemporary macro models with formal optimization enable one "to derive op-
timal policy based on the correct (within the model) welfare criterion". Most
tellingly, perhaps, the evaluation of outcomes based on the stipulated utility
function of the representative agent is usually presented without any argument
or caveat.
Although widespread and well-established, there is nothing objective about
this approach to welfare analysis. There is no justication for the implicit claim
that the same function which describes the representative agent can do double
duty as a measure of social welfare. The representative agent is designed to
explain average behavior and, loosely speaking, this average is determined using
the economic resources of individual agents as weights. Because a rich agent
inuences aggregate consumption patterns more strongly than a poor agent, the
preferences of the rich agent are given greater weight in the construction of the
representative agent and hence also in the evaluation of social welfare. In the
climate literature the biases can a¤ect the abatement recommendations from
representative-agent models.
At a general level the problems are well known. There is a big literature
on cost-benet analysis and the issues are similar.4 Our main contribution in
this paper is to provide simple examples that illustrate the problems and relate
3Despite his endorsement of Nordhauss descriptive approach, Weitzmans conclusions are
similar to those of Stern: his analysis of risk and the possibility of catastrophic change implies
a low discount rate. In Weitzmans words, the Stern report may have been "right for the
wrong reasons" (2007, p. 724).
4See Ackerman and Heinzerling (2005), Baum (2009), Sen (2000), Stanton (2010) and Stern
(2006) for recent discussions with reference to climate change.
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them to existing IAMs, especially the DICE and RICE models (Nordhaus 2008,
Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). We focus on distributional issues that are unrelated
to discounting and other intertemporal questions. Given this purpose, little is
lost by ignoring the time dimension. Thus, we consider a static setting and
assume that all costs and benets occur in the same period.
Section 2 examines policy decisions in models with a well-dened represen-
tative agent. The models are highly stylized. There are two types of agents and
we assume, in particular, that one good is consumed exclusively by one of the
types and another good exclusively by the other type. This assumption may
seem restrictive but the goods need not be ordinary goods: they can represent
the non-market outcomes in two di¤erent regions. This interpretation and the
relevance of the examples is discussed more fully at the end of the section.
The examples in Section 2 describe exchange economies without any pro-
duction. Production is introduced in Section 3. The setting is similar to that
of the RICE model. The economy is regionally disaggregated, there is inequal-
ity across regions, and the damages from climate change can be calculated in
di¤erent ways, with or without some kind of equity weighting. However, a
unique, optimal level of emissions can be determined independently of distribu-
tion if two assumptions are satised: there is a single, homogeneous consumption
good and this good can be transferred between regions. The crucial role of the
rst assumption (a single generalized consumption good) is illustrated by the
examples in Section 2: in these examples the separation between e¢ ciency and
distribution breaks down and policies that maximize a standard measure of real
output have a strong regressive bias.
The transfer assumption is the focus of Section 4 which develops a three good
example. The example builds on Sections 2-3. There is one produced good and
two non-produced environmental goods. The produced good is tradable and
consumed in all regions; the two environmental goods are non-traded and can-
not be transferred. An (extremely restrictive) assumption of perfect substitution
means that the e¢ cientlevel of emissions will be uniquely dened, despite the
existence of three goods, and the distributional outcome is determined by trans-
fers (the allocation of emission permits across regions). The section analyzes
how di¤erent allocation schemes can have adverse distributional consequences:
the e¢ cient solution with a reasonable-looking allocation scheme can produce a
(utilitarian) welfare loss. Section 5 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
2 Some simple examples with a well-dened rep-
resentative agent
Well-behaved preferences at the agent level do not imply that aggregate out-
comes behave as if they were generated by an optimizing representative agent.5
5This result, which has been well-known since the work of Debreu (1974), Mantel (1976) and
Sonnenschein (1972), undermines the claims of modern macro to be built on microeconomic
foundations (Kirman 1992).
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In some cases, however, a well-dened representative agent does exist, and these
are clearly the cases that are most favorable to the representative-agent ap-
proach. Our examples focus on cases of this kind. The examples show that,
even in these cases, the use of the representative agent for welfare analysis is
highly questionable.6
2.1 A two-good example
Consider an economy with two types of agents, A types who consume only
good 1 and B-types who consume only good 2. The total endowment of the two
goods is q1 and q2; and all agents have endowment compositions that mirror
the aggregate composition (changes in relative prices therefore have no distri-
butional e¤ects). These assumptions imply that the share of good 1 in total
expenditure is equal to the share of A-agents in total income (= their share in
endowments). If  is the income share of A-agents, aggregate excess demands in
this economy can be derived from the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility
function,
U = q1 q
1 
2 (1)
subject to the aggregate budget constraint p1q1 + p2q2 = p1q1 + p2q2. Thus,
equation (1) represents the preferences of a representative agent for this econ-
omy.
Assume that initially q1 = q2 = q and that an opportunity now arises which
would raise q1 marginally but reduce q2 by the same amount. Is social welfare
increased by moving from the endowment bundle (q; q) to the new bundle (q +
; q )? Using the utility function (1) as the yardstick, the change in welfare
is given by
dU = (
q2
q1
) [
q2
q1
  (1  )] = (2  1) (2)
Hence, the analyst must conclude in favor of the policy if  collectively 
A agents have more than 50 percent of the resources. The conclusion does
not depend on whether a high  reects a large share of A agents in the pop-
ulation (with all agents having the same endowment) or a large endowment for
each A agent (with the same number of A and B agents). In this sense the
welfare criterion is independent of distribution. In general, however, the policy
implications are highly regressive. Consider two economies: they have the same
proportion of A and B agents, but A agents are richer than B agents in one
economy while B agents are richer in the other economy. Representative-agent
evaluations will give di¤erent conclusions: the analyst will recommend the pol-
icy which favors A agents in the economy with rich A agents but reject the
policy when A agents are poor.
This two-good example is one of pure conict. A and B agents consume
di¤erent goods. Any change in the overall composition of the goods must
6According to Kirman (1992), there are cases in which a policy change raises the utility of
all agents but reduces the utility of the representative agent. His argument for this proposition
seems unclear, however, and arguably the case with conicting interests (which Kirman does
not discuss) is both more interesting and empirically more relevant.
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benet one type and hurt the other. Compensation is impossible, and there
are no Pareto improving changes in the composition of the endowments. The
representative-agent approach glosses over this conict. It gives a clear and
unambiguous policy recommendation: do what is good for the rich. There is an
intrinsic bias in favor of the rich.
2.2 A three-good example
Empirically, the consumption sets of the rich and the poor are not completely
disjoint. Some goods are valued by all agents and this opens up the possibility
of compensation and Pareto improving changes. We examine this case using an
extended model with three goods.
As in the two-good example, there are two types of agent, A and B, and
all agents have the same endowment composition. The new element is the
introduction of a good that is valued and consumed by both types of agent.
The preferences of the agents are given by Cobb-Douglas utility functions
UA = q1Aq
1 
3A (3)
UB = q2Bq
1 
3B (4)
where qij is the consumption of good i by agent j: As in Section 2.1, we let 
denote the share of A-agents in total income (YA = Y; YB = (1  )Y ).
With this combination of preferences and endowments, the consumption
patterns of the two agents satisfy
p1q1A = YA; p2q2A = 0; p3q3A = (1  )YA (5)
p1q1B = 0; p2q2B = YB ; p3q3B = (1  )YB (6)
Thus, the aggregate demands (q1 = q1A + q1B ; q2 = q2A + q2B ; q3 = q3A + q3B)
for the three goods are given by the following equations:
p1q1 = Y (7)
p2q2 = (1  )Y (8)
p3q3 = (1  )Y (9)
The demand structure in equations (7)-(9) can be derived from the optimiz-
ing behavior of a single representative agent with utility function
U = q1 q
(1 )
2 q
1 
3 (10)
and budget constraint p1q1 + p2q2 + p3q3 = p1q1 + p2q2 + p3q3 = Y:
2.2.1 Marginal changes
Consider the same policy question as in Section 2.1. Should we increase the
supply of good 1 at the expense of a reduction in the supply of good 2? With
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a one-for-one tradeo¤ and supplies of the two goods that are equal initially, a
marginal change of this kind would have a welfare e¤ect given by
dU = (
q3
q
)1  [2  1] (11)
where q = q1 = q2 is the initial supply of the goods 1 and 2. The conclusion is
similar to the earlier example: implement the policy if  > 0:5:
Unlike in the two-good example, the policy decision does not directly prej-
udice the distributional outcome. A agents are the direct beneciaries of the
policy but the B-agents could be compensated by raising their share of the con-
sumption of good 3. Having the third good means that Pareto improvements
become possible.
There are two extreme cases of Pareto improvements: one in which all the
improvements go to A agents and one in which only B agents benet. Keep-
ing UB unchanged following a marginal increase in q1 (and an equal marginal
decrease in q2) requires
0 = dUB = 
UB
q2B
dq2B + (1  )U
B
q3B
dq3B (12)
or
dq3B
dq1
=

1  
q3B
q2B
=

1  
(1  )q3
q1
(13)
where we have used dq2 =  dq1 (by assumption this is the tradeo¤) and q3B =
(1   )q3, q2B = q2 = q1 at the initial position (these equilibrium conditions
follow from (5)-(6)). Since dq3B =  dq3A, we can now derive the gain to the
A-agents in the case where dUB = 0 :
dUA =  (
q3
q1
)1  [2  1]dq1 (14)
Analogously, setting dUA = 0, the increase in q3B and the marginal increase
in the utility of B agents can be found:
dq3B
dq1
=

1  
q3A
q1A
=

1  
q3
q1
(15)
dUB = (1  ) ( q3
q1
)1  [2  1]dq1 (16)
The largest improvement in aggregate utility, UA + UB ; comes when all
the net gains are given to the poor B agents: the symmetric specications of
the utility functions in equations (3)-(4) imply that poor agents have a higher
marginal utility. If one rejects cardinality of the utility function, however, no
signicance attaches to the magnitudes of the expressions in equations (14) and
(16), and interpersonal comparisons of utility gains become meaningless. But
the expressions in (13) and (15) still hold without cardinality, and the policy
generates a Pareto improvement if the compensating change dq3B=dq1 falls in
the interval between the expressions on the right-hand-sides of (13) and (15).
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2.2.2 Non-marginal change
The analysis in Section 2.2.1 analyzed marginal changes. One can also look for
the optimal amount of good 2 to convert (one-for-one) into good 1. We consider
four di¤erent approaches to this question.
Case I: A generalized consumption good The initial equilibrium can
be used to dene a generalized consumption good. Using p3 as the numeraire,
the demand equations (7)-(9) can be combined with the initial supplies (q1 =
q2 = q; q3) to give the pre-policy equilibrium prices
p1 =

1  
q3
q
(17)
p2 =
(1  )
1  
q3
q
(18)
p3 = 1 (19)
A generalized good can be dened using these weights,
c = p1q1 + p2q2 + q3 (20)
If the utility of the representative agent is taken to be an increasing function
of the consumption of this generalized good, policy should aim to maximize
c = p1q1 + p2q2 + q3: By assumption, there is a onefor-one transformation
between goods 1 and 2. The prices of the two goods are di¤erent, however, and
using this criterion the policy-maker should convert all existing supplies of good
2 into good 1 if  > 0:5.
Case II: Using the utility function of the representative agent The
answer in this case is found by maximizing (10) subject to the conditions
q1 + q2 = q1 + q2 (21)
q3 = q3 (22)
The result is
(
q2
q1
);rep =
1  

(23)
Case III: Maximizing UA subject to dUB = 0 Straightforward calcula-
tions yield (see the appendix)
(
q2
q1
);maxA =
[2(1  )]1 
2  [2(1  )]1  =
(1  )
[2(1  )]   1 +  (24)
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Case IV: Maximizing UB subject to dUA = 0 The optimal ratio in this
case becomes
(
q2
q1
);maxB =
2  (2)1 
(2)1 
=
(2)   

(25)
Case I extends the marginal analysis to a non-marginal question. Using
the equilibrium prices that apply at the initial state, this approach generates
a policy recommendation that wipes out all of the consumption good that is
specic to the poor. Given the specication of the utility functions, the poor
cannot be compensated for this by a redistribution of good 3: with q2B = 0;
their utility is identically equal to zero.7 It follows, in particular, that having
chosen q2 = 0; a Pareto improvement can now be obtained by setting q3B = 0
and q3A = q3:
Eschewing the use of prices and local approximations, cases II-IV base the
policy recommendation on utility functions and in cases III and IV distrib-
utional requirements. The results are quite di¤erent in the three cases. It can
be seen that for  > 0:5, we have8
(
q2
q1
);maxB > (
q2
q1
);maxA > (
q2
q1
);rep (26)
Comparing cases III and IV, it is intuitively obvious that B agents will do
better when they get all the net benets from the change. This intuition is
reected in a larger ratio of their preferred good: the ratio q2=q1 is higher in
the case that favors B agents (the rst inequality in (26)).
Case II, which uses the utility function of the representative agent, reduces
the ratio q2=q1 compared to cases III and IV (the last inequality in (26)):9
7The extreme outcome with q2B = 0 no longer holds  even with xed prices  if the
technical transformation of good 2 into good 1 were subject to diminishing returns. But using
the initial equilibrium prices as weights still amplies the magnitude of the recommended
change.
8The second inequality follows directly from the observation that [2(1   )]   1 < 0 for
 > 0:5: The rst inequality can be derived by noting that
(2)   

>
(1  )
[2(1  )]   1 + 
()
[2 1   1][2(1  ) 1   1] > 1
()
2 > 1  + (1  )1 
The expression on the right-hand-side of the latter inequality has a maximum at  = 0:5 with
the maximum value equal to 2 :
9The magnitude of the di¤erence between the three solutions for q2=q1 depends on the value
of : The non-market goods are important if  is large. In this case, any change in the relative
supplies of goods 1 and 2 will have a big impact on the compensation that is required to avoid
a decline in the utility of the poor. As a result, only a small range of changes in relative
supply can produce a Pareto improvement: in the limit we have lim!1(q2=q1);Bmax =
lim!1(q2=q1);Amax = 1: Conversely, a small value of  implies that cases II-IV yield similar
results. Thus, we have lim!0(q2=q1);Bmax = lim!0(q2=q1);Amax = (q2=q1);rep =
(1  )=.
8
The poor B agents are hurt by this reduction. In principle, they could be
compensated by an increase in their share of good 3. If the post-policy outcome
is to be Pareto e¢ cient, however, there can be no such compensating increase.
To see this, note that the composition of goods 1 and 2 is chosen so as to match
the initial equilibrium outcome for q3B=q3A:10 Pareto e¢ ciency requires that
q2=q1 = q3B=q3A; and it follows that having set the supply ratio q2=q1 equal
to the initial consumption ratio for good 3 this initial equilibrium composition
of good-3 consumption must be maintained if the new allocation is to be e¢ cient.
Policies that combine the case-II value of q2=q1 with redistribution of good 3
may achieve a Pareto improvement, but they will not be Pareto e¢ cient.
In short, in this example the representative-agent analysis leads to an out-
come that is either ine¢ cient or distributionally regressive. This conclusion is
related to the dependence of the descriptive representative agent on the distrib-
ution of income. If we change the distribution of income in order to compensate
the poor in region B for a decline in their consumption of the non-market good
then the appropriate denition of the representative agent is a¤ected: the share
of A-agents () is a parameter in the representative agents utility function,
equation (10). This result illustrates one of the problems with the Lucas-inspired
program of micro-foundedmacroeconomics. The microeconomic foundations
for macroeconomics were needed, Lucas argued, because the preferences of indi-
vidual agents could be taken as invariant to changes in economic policy. But as
shown by the example, distributional changes (a change in the share of the A-
agents) imply that the representative agent has to be re-dened. Real-world pol-
icy changes invariably have distributional consequences. Hence, contemporary
macro is itself subject to a Lucas critique: the preferences of the representative
agent are not structurally invariant.
2.3 Discussion
The two- and three-good examples in Sections 2.1-2.2 have well-dened repre-
sentative agents. Changes in relative prices have no distributional e¤ects, but
this does not eliminate distributional conicts. The preferences and the compo-
sition of the consumption bundles di¤er across agents, and there are potential
conicts over both the distribution and composition of the endowment bundles.
The examples are simple and abstract, and they may seem far removed
from the climate debate. The assumption that good 1 is consumed only by
A-types and good 2 only by B-types may appear particularly restrictive. This
concern would be reasonable if the goods were thought of as ordinary, traded
goods. But another interpretation is possible. Many of the important e¤ects of
climate change are outside the market sphere. Health and mortality e¤ects are
obvious examples, but broader social implications (including migration and the
possibility of wars and other upheavals in the wake of strong regional e¤ects)
fall in this category too. The non-market e¤ects of climate change are unevenly
10This happens because both the parameters of the representative agents utility function
and the consumption ratio q3B=q3A are determined by the distribution of income.
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distributed, and goods 1 and 2 can be interpreted as the non-market outcomes
in two di¤erent regions, a rich A region and a poor B region.
An interpretation which has good 1 representing the health of people in
region A and good 2 the health of people in region B may seem inconsistent
with the assumption that all agents receive endowment bundles with the same
composition. The utility functions, however, mean that A-agents get no utility
from the consumption of good 2 and B-agents no utility from good 1. With this
specication of preferences, the outcome of an economy in which all three goods
are traded and the initial compositions are the same across agents is isomorphic
to the outcome in an economy in which all good-1 endowments are given to A
agents, all good-2 endowments are given to the B-agents, and only good 3 is
tradable. Neither economy will see any trade in good 3, and both economies
will have A-agents consume the total supply of good 1 and B-agents the total
supply of good 2.
The damages of climate change fall disproportionately on poor regions while
the benets from continued greenhouse gas emissions accrue more strongly to
richer regions. A stylized version of this distributional pattern can be captured
in the 3-good example by associating an increase in emissions with an increase
in the supply of good 1 at the expense of good 2.
3 Integrated assessment models
3.1 The setting
Building on a number of earlier contributions, Nordhaus (1992, 1994) presented
the rst version of the DICE model. Since then the model has gone through
several iterations, and the analysis has been extended in many ways. From
our perspective the most interesting extension is the explicit incorporation of
regional disaggregation in the RICE versions of the model.
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) disaggregate the analysis by looking at 8 di¤er-
ent regions. Each region is assumed to maximize a social welfare function. The
argument of the welfare function is the level of per-capita generalized consump-
tion, which includes both market and non-market e¤ects of climate change.11
A logarithmic specication of instantaneous per capita utility is used,
u(cj) = log cj (27)
where cj is the per-capita consumption in region j:
Regional consumption is equal to output minus investment, and output is
given by a Cobb-Douglas production function (p. 17-18)
Qj = 
j(AjK

j L
1  
j E

j  mjEj) (28)
11 In general, the weights used to calculate a generalized consumption good will be changing
in response to changes in the consumption bundle. Hoel and Sterner (2007) examine the
e¤ects of these changes on the relevant discount rates in an optimal growth model with two
goods: a slow growing environmental good and a fast-growing standard consumption good.
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where E is carbon-energy and m is the cost of this intermediate input; Q is
output, K and L are capital and labor, and A represents the level of technol-
ogy. The regional estimate of 
 represents the proportional loss of regional
output from climate change. This loss depends on the average temperature,
and temperatures in turn are related to emissions.
The regional loss varies signicantly across regions. A rise of 2.5 degree
Celsius in average temperatures produces an estimated output loss of 0.45 per-
cent in the US, while the estimated loss of output in the group of low-income
countries amounts to 2.64 percent.
The global loss can be found as a weighted average of the regional losses, and
two distinct measures are presented: one using output weights and one using
population weights.
Output loss Output is treated as homogeneous in the model. Generalized
output (and consumption) in region i can be transformed one-for-one into gen-
eralized output in region j. Thus, aggregate output is given by
Q =
X
Qj (29)
and the rst measure of global damages is a standard expression for the pro-
portional output loss:
dQ
Q
=
X dQj
Q
=
X Qj
Q
dQj
Qj
=
X Qj
Q
d
j

j
(30)
Welfare loss An indicator of output loss does not give an accurate picture of
the welfare implications. Equation (27) implies that marginal utility is declining
in consumption, and an additional unit of consumption does not provide the
same utility gain to a rich person as to a poor person. Population weights can
be seen as a way of adjusting for this.
Nordhaus and Boyer do not discuss the population weights in any detail,
but the population-weighted output loss approximates the welfare implications
of the damages when the utility function is logarithmic. A utilitarian approach
denes total welfare as the population weighted average of regional welfare,
W =
X Nj
N
u(cj) (31)
where Nj and N denote regional and global population. With a logarithmic
utility function it follows that the change in welfare can be written
dW =
X Nj
N
u0(cj)dcj =
X Nj
N
dcj
cj
=
X Nj
N
d
j

j
(32)
where the last equality follows from an assumption of proportionality between
output and consumption (and from the calculation of the loss for given values
of A;K;L;E).
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Because damages are higher and consumption is lower in poor regions, popu-
lation weighted measures produce higher estimates of aggregate damages. Thus,
in Nordhaus and Boyers model, the use of population weights increases esti-
mates of the damages resulting from a ve degree Celsius increase in global
mean temperature from six percent to eight percent of GDP. Similarly, Tol
(2002) nds that equity-weighted estimates lead to a doubling of projected
damages associated with a 5 degree increase in temperatures. In general, there
is widespread agreement among economists that some kind of weighting can
be used to capture the welfare e¤ects of an uneven distribution of damages; as
an example, the Stern review seems to endorse this approach (Stern, 2006, pp.
148-149).
Discussion The utilitarian approach to welfare is controversial and raises is-
sues that are beyond the scope of this paper. Staying within the standard
optimal-growth framework, there is no consensus on the denition of equity.
The Nordhaus and Boyer adjustment invites two obvious (and well-known)
points. The disaggregation, rst, is not taken very far. Increasing the num-
ber of regions will almost certainly raise the population weighted estimate of
damages. Moreover, within each region the damages are likely to a¤ect the
poor more strongly than the rich which  if taken into account would raise
the estimates even further.12
The second problem is more technical. The population weighting provides
a good (local) approximation of welfare changes if the utility function u(cj)
is logarithmic. The logarithmic specication is the limiting case of a general
CRRA utility function, u(cj) = (c
1 
j   1)=(1   ), with  ! 1. It is widely
suggested, however, that a specication with  > 1 gives a better t for the
preferences of the representative agent, and a higher value of  implies that
marginal utility falls o¤ more rapidly as consumption increases.13 As a result,
the outcomes for the poor need to be given even greater weight in order to get
an estimate of the total welfare loss. Formally, if u(cj) = (c
1 
j   1)=(1  ),
dW =
X Nj
N
u0(cj)dcj =
X Nj
N
c j dcj =
X Nj
N
c +1j
dcj
cj
=
X Nj
N
c +1j
d
j

j
(33)
As an example, consider a three-region case: a rich region with income at 2 and
damages at 1 percent, a middle income region with income at 1 and damages at
2 percent, and a poor region with income at 0.5 and damages at 3 percent, and
assume that population is evenly divided across the three regions. The income
weighted output loss is 1.57 percent (equation (30)); the welfare loss, however,
is 2 percent if the utility function is logarithmic (in which case the welfare loss
equals the population weighted output loss, equation (32)) and 2.83 percent if
 = 2 (equation (33)):14
12See Antho¤ et al. (2010) for a recent discussion.
13Nordhaus (2008) assumes  = 2:
14One may note also that if  > 1; the welfare loss will depend on the degree of inequality,
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Azar and Sterner (1996) discuss the e¤ects of disaggregation on the welfare
loss; see also Antho¤ et al. (2009). Nordhaus and Boyer, however, do not
pursue these issues, and there is no need for them to do this. Their approach
implies that equity weighting becomes largely irrelevant for the calculation of
the e¢ cient level of mitigation.
3.2 The optimal solution
Consider a true one-good world in which the utility of individuals depends ex-
clusively on their consumption of this good. In this world e¢ ciency requires
that the amount of the good be made as large as possible; in general this con-
dition also determines where the production (and emissions) should take place.
Once total consumption has been maximized, the outcome will be Pareto ef-
cient no matter how the good is distributed among regions and individuals.
Thus, the optimal amount of mitigation can be found without any reference to
distribution. This independence of e¢ ciency from distribution does not imply
that distribution is unimportant from a welfare perspective. But in a one-good
world, equity concerns are separate from e¢ ciency. Equity-weighted damages
can be calculated to illustrate the di¤erential impact of global warming, but
they play no role in the derivation of the optimal level of emissions.15
The Nordhaus-Boyer model reduces all outcomes to a single good, general-
ized consumption. But their model does not describe a true one-good world.
The generalized consumption good is constructed using relative prices associ-
ated with an initial equilibrium. In this respect the Nordhaus-Boyer argument
ts case I in Section 2.2.
As shown in Section 2.2, the maximization of the total supply of generalized
consumption shifts the policy recommendations further in the interest of the
rich regions than would be justied by a representative-agent analysis which
itself is biased in favor of the rich. Moreover, e¢ ciency cannot be separated
from distribution if the one-good assumption is abandoned. The examples in
section 2.2 illustrate this general point: the representative-agent analysis in case
II led to a recommendation that was only e¢ cient for a particular distribution
of income.
even if all regions su¤er the same proportional damage. Thus, if d
j=
j = d
=

dW =
X Nj
N
c +1j
d
j

j
=
d



X Nj
N
c +1j 
d



c +1
with equality i¤ cj = c for all j:
15Assuming that the consumption good can be transferred. See Chichilnisky and Heal
(1993) for an analysis of cases where no such transfer is possible.
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4 The case of perfect substitution
4.1 Compensation
The Nordhaus-Boyer approach is theoretically valid in the special case of perfect
substitution between goods 1 and 3 for A-agents and between goods 2 and 3
for B-agents (this special case e¤ectively means that we have a true one-good
world). The assumption of perfect substitution is extremely restrictive and has
no empirical support, but let us accept it for the sake of the argument.
Having found the optimal level of emissions, the distribution of the avail-
able amount of generalized consumption across regions has to be determined. A
radical utilitarian approach would maximize the sum of utility. Using the same
(cardinal) utility functions for rich and poor agents, the distributional conse-
quences would be immense. If global mitigation e¤orts are linked strongly with
dramatic redistribution, however, it may be di¢ cult to get the rich countries to
participate. Recognizing this, Ackerman et al. (2010) who adopt a utilitarian
approach temper their recommendations by including several constraints, one
of them that consumption in the rich countries must not decline in absolute
terms.
A focus on Pareto improvements would seem to be in line with Nordhauss
stated objective to "examine potential improvements within the existing distri-
bution of income" (cf. above p. 1). In terms of our examples in Section 2, the
relevant outcomes then fall in the range between those of cases III and IV, with
equity concerns presumably tilting the choice towards case IV which favors the
poor.16
Nordhaus and Boyer do not discuss the compensation issue in any detail.
Implicitly, however, their position on distribution is reected in the allocation
of emission permits. Emissions can be controlled through tradable permits, and
the total number of permits is determined by the e¢ ciency requirement. But
the initial allocation of these permits has distributional e¤ects.17 The issues can
be illustrated using an extended version of the models in Section 2.
4.2 3-good example with production
Building on the 3-good example in Section 2, we dene the regional welfare as
a function of the consumption of goods 1 and 3 in region A and goods 2 and
3 in region B. Unlike in Section 2, however, it is assumed that there is perfect
substitution. A-agents are willing to substitute one-for-one between goods 1 and
3 and their utility is determined by the sum of their consumption of goods 1 and
3; B-agentsutility, analogously, is determined by the sum of their consumption
16 IPCC (1996, chapter 3) surveys the literature on equity in the distribution of emissions
and abatement costs.
17Note that these distributional e¤ects occur both within and across countries; see, for
example, Brenner et al 2007 for a discussion of distributional e¤ects within China.
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of goods 2 and 3. Thus,
UA = U(c1A; c3A) = u(c1 + c3A) = u(c
A) (34)
UB = U(c2B ; c3B) = u(c2 + c3B) = u(c
B) (35)
where cA = c1+ c3A and cB = c2+ c3B are the levels of consumption in the two
regions.
Instead of given endowments, the three goods are now produced. The non-
market goods, c1 and c2, are the result of global warming and their amounts
depend on the total emissions ( E = EA + EB with Ei representing aggregate
emissions in region i) :
c1 = H
A( E) (36)
c2 = H
B( E) (37)
The production of the market good good 3 in the two regions is a function
of emissions. Algebraically,
c3A = Y3A = F
A(EA; E); F2  0 (38)
c3B = Y3B = F
B(EB ; E); F2  0 (39)
Individual producers of good 3 take the aggregate emissions E as exogenously
given. The e¤ect of Ei on c3i, by contrast, expresses a rm-level relation between
emissions and output. For simplicity, only emissions are included explicitly
in the production functions for good 3 (equations (38)-(39)). Other factors,
including labor and capital, are taken to be in xed supply.
Using linear and quadratic versions of (35)-(39), let
c1 = H
A( E) = C0   A E (40)
c2 = H
B( E) = [C0   B E] (41)
Y3A = Y0 + EA   
2
E2A   A E (42)
Y3B = [Y0 + EB   
2
E2B   B E] (43)
where  < 1 and where the constants (C0; Y0) and (C0; Y0) represent the
available supplies of non-market and market goods in the two regions when
there are no emissions. The technology in the poor B region is less advanced
( < 1):18 Emission damages may also be assessed di¤erently in the two regions,
18 It may seem unreasonable to scale the poor regions supply of the non-market good by the
technology factor: The scaling, however, roughly reects the standard valuations of non-
market e¤ects. The willingness to pay which forms the basis for the valuations  depends
strongly on ability to pay. The calculations of damages resulting from climate change therefore
use a higher statistical value of human life in rich areas than in poor areas. In Tols (1995)
analysis, for example, the value of a statistical life is "assumed to equal $250,000 + 175 times
the average income per capita(p. 369). Analogously, in their regional model, Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000, p. 82) value a "year of life lost" at two years of per capita income, again giving
a lower value to lives in low income regions.
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both because of direct climate e¤ects on traditional production (A ? B) and
because of di¤erences in the valuation of non-market damages (A ? B).
Treating aggregate emissions as exogenous, a laissez-faire solution implies
that
EmarketA =
1

; EmarketB =
1

(44)
E¢ cient regional intervention has each region maximize its own welfare, taking
as given the emissions from the other region.19 The result in this case is given
by
EregA =
1  A   A

; EregB =
1  B   B

(45)
The globally e¢ cient outcome which takes into account the global externality
reduces the emissions further:
EeffA =
1  A   A   B   B

; EeffB =
  A   A   B   B

(46)
The RICE model nds the globally e¢ cient solution and thus the number of
emission permits to be issued. The price of these permits will be equal to the
marginal damage from emissions:
ppermit = A + A + B + B (47)
4.3 Permit allocation
4.3.1 Revenue neutrality
Nordhaus and Boyer suggest that the permits be allocated "in a revenue-neutral
way across countries" where "a revenue-neutral permit allocation grants each
region permits equal to its emissions at the equilibrium carbon tax" (p. 25).20
This allocation implies that region A is given EeffA permits while region B gets
EeffB : As a result there is trade in neither permits nor the tradable good 3.
The absence of trade holds also for the laissez-faire and regional-intervention
regimes. Thus, in all three regimes, the consumption pattern for generalized
consumption can be found by substituting the levels of emissions into :
cA = c1 + Y3A = C0   A E + Y0 + EA  

2
E2A   A E (48)
cB = [C0   B E] + [Y0 + EB  

2
E2B   B E] (49)
By construction the globally e¢ cient solution raises aggregate consumption,
but the e¢ cient regime with revenue neutrality need not produce a Pareto im-
provement. This possibility is illustrated by the following numerical example.
19The implementation of this outcome requires policy intervention, whether in the form of
emission permits or taxes.
20 If emissions are controlled by a tax then the equilibrium carbon tax is equal to the price
of permits in (47).
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Example 1  = 1=3;  = 0:1; A = B = A = B = 0:05
With these parameter values the income of the poor region declines in the
e¢ cient solution compared to both laissez-faire and regional intervention (see
Table 1). A revenue neutral allocation of permits means that no compensation
will take place, and if the utility functions are su¢ ciently concave the overall
e¤ect on social welfare will be negative (assuming a utilitarian measure of social
welfare). The increase in e¢ ciency has produced greater inequality and a decline
in aggregate welfare.
The intuition behind the outcome in example 1 is straightforward. The
rich countries may have large emissions, but they are also likely to be e¢ cient
producers (they have gained this energy e¢ ciency partly through past learning-
by-doing which itself involved emissions). Hence, it becomes e¢ cient to locate
production in the rich countries, and revenue neutrality means that there is no
compensation to the rest of the world, as long as the rich-country emissions do
not exceed the e¢ cient level. In fact, revenue neutrality means that one can
have the paradoxical outcome in which a poor region that has low emissions
and inicts little damage is required to compensate the rich simply because it
may have failed to reduce its (low) emissions to the e¢ cient level (which is even
lower because the region is poor).
Example 1 assumes symmetry in damages. The benets to the poor from
reducing emissions increase if the damages fall more heavily on the poor. This
is illustrated by example 2 which assumes symmetry in productivity ( = 1)
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but di¤erences in damages (A < B ; A < B). The example is calibrated to
give the same relative consumption as example 1 in the laissez-faire case.
Example 2  = 1;  = 0:1; A = A = 0:05; B = B = 0:1
This parameter constellation implies that the income of the poor region
increases in the e¢ cient scenario relative to the scenario with regional e¢ ciency
and a fortiori relative to laissez faire (Table 1). Most of the benets in this
example accrue to the poor region.
4.3.2 Damage neutrality
Revenue neutrality can produce outcomes that are distinctly non-neutral. The
underlying principle also seems peculiar: why not give the permits to the regions
that su¤er the damage rather than to those that inict the damage? Following
a rights-based line of reasoning, the net compensation from one region to the
rest of the world could be calculated as the di¤erence between (i) the estimated
global damages from the regions emissions and (ii) the estimated damage from
global emissions on the regions own net output.21
In a damage-neutral scheme the permits are allocated to the regions in pro-
portion to the damages that they su¤er. In terms of the two numerical examples,
a damage neutral allocation implies the following net transfer from A to B:
 = ppermit[EA   A + A
A + A + (B + B)
(EA + EB)]
= (B + B)EA   (A + A)EB (50)
These damage neutral transfers benet the poor region when the parameters
are as in example 2 (see Table 1). With the parameters from example 1, how-
ever, the poor region does worse than under revenue neutrality (Table 1). This
deterioration of the outcome for the poor region illustrates an important point:
the fairness of a damage neutral allocation depends on the calculation of the
damages. The allocation can be very unfair if market prices and willingness to
pay are used to estimate damages. Suppose for instance that (i) the only dam-
ages are loss of life, (ii) the same number of lives is lost in each of two regions,
and (iii) the regions produce roughly the same level of emissions. Under these
circumstances, the poor region will be required to compensate the rich since
lives are valued more highly in the rich region.
4.3.3 Population neutrality
As a parallel to Nordhaus and Boyers use of population weights in the calcu-
lation of equity-weighted damages, a population-neutral allocation of permits
distribute the permits in proportion to population.22 In our simple model, if the
A and B regions have the same size population, transfers based on this principle
21Damage-neutrality corresponds to the compensationcase in Antho¤ and Tol (2010).
22For advocacy and discussion of population neutrality, see Narain and Riddle (2007).
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benet the poor when the parameters are as in example 1; using example-2 pa-
rameters, however, the poor do no better than under revenue neutrality (Table
1).
4.4 Discussion
The numerical examples in this section consider three di¤erent permit alloca-
tions. All three allocations can be considered neutralin some sense.23 Their
implications, however, are very di¤erent. The examples are stylized but they
serve to illustrate why e¢ cient allocations may fail to produce Pareto improve-
ments, even when paired with seemingly reasonable principles of permit alloca-
tion.
The examples point to a general issue. There is a tension in much of the eco-
nomic literature on climate change between utilitarian notions and an emphasis
on e¢ ciencyand Pareto-optimality. E¢ cient policies may produce a welfare
loss, from a utilitarian perspective, if they hurt the poor. Conversely, welfare
gains can be obtained if starting from an e¢ cient solution with inequality 
the poor regions are allowed to increase their emissions EB with a concomitant
reduction in rich-region emissions EA: The reason is obvious: this reallocation
of emissions redistributes income towards the poor who have a high marginal
utility, and if the initial allocation is e¢ cient, the rst-order welfare gain domi-
nates the second-order e¢ ciency loss. From a welfare perspective, an ine¢ cient
outcome can be better than many e¢ cient solutions.
Ine¢ cient reallocations of emissions may not be the best way to implement
a welfare enhancing redistribution of income. A standard economic argument
suggests that if redistribution is desired, it should be implemented without cre-
ating unnecessary distortions. There is something disingenuous, however, about
an approach that (i) insists on mitigation e¢ ciency, whatever the distributional
consequences, (ii) argues that compensation must also be done e¢ ciently, but
(iii) fails to provide a mechanism to ensure that compensation will in fact be
made and (iv) introduces revenue-neutral allocations which cannot be justied
on e¢ ciency grounds and which (almost certainly) are distributionally regres-
sive.
The fact that compensation payments from the rich to the poor could po-
tentially produce a Pareto improvement is largely irrelevant. As argued by Sen
(2000),
There is a real motivational tension in the use of the logic of
compensation for reading social welfare. If compensations are actu-
ally paid, then of course we do not need the compensation criterion,
since the actual outcome already includes the paid compensations
and can be judged without reference to compensation tests.... On
23Another option, founded in the language of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, is to allocate rights across nations on the basis of the two principles of responsibility
and capacity; see the greenhouse development rightsproposal by Baer, et al (2008) for an
example translating these two principles into an operational plan.
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the other hand, if compensations are not paid, it is not at all clear
in what sense it can be said that this is a social improvement.... The
compensation tests are either redundant or unconvincing (p. 947).
5 Conclusion
It is sometimes suggested that the science behind global warming may be weak
but that the economics of the integrated assessment models is well-established
and sound. We are not in position to evaluate the science but well-established
as it may be, the economics is questionable.
The descriptive representative-agent approach is not value free. It has an
intrinsic regressive bias, and this bias also has implications for the calculations of
optimal emissions. The damages of climate change are expected to be relatively
concentrated in poor regions while the benets from continued greenhouse gas
emissions accrue more strongly to richer regions. As a result, the maintenance
of standards of living in the rich areas is overemphasized at the expense of
environmental degradation. The policy that is best for the representative agent
will impose relatively lower utility costs on rich regions of world than would be
justied by evaluations that are sensitive to distributional considerations.
There are no objective, value-free answers to normative questions that in-
volve distributional conicts. Any attempt to derive an optimal amount of
emissions is contingent on some underlying implicit or explicit value judg-
ment. The descriptive representative-agent approach tries to avoid judgments
of this kind. But not wanting to take sides easily leads to a de facto siding
with the rich. Regressive biases are introduced into the IAMs through the use
of descriptive representative agents, the reduction of consumption bundles to a
generalized consumption good, and the allocation of emission permits.
Appendix: Derivation of equation (24)
The pre-policy solution has q2B = q and q3B = (1   )q3: Thus, the policy
problem in this case is to maximize UA = q1 q
1 
3A subject to the constraints
q1 + q2 = 2q (A.1)
q3A + q3B = q3 (A.2)
UB = q2 q
1 
3B = q
((1  )q3)1  (A.3)
Substituting (51) and (52) in (53) the problem can be re-written as
max q1 q
1 
3A (A.4)
s:t (A.5)
(2q   q1)(q3   q3A)1  = q((1  )q3)1 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The Lagrange function becomes
L = q1 q
1 
3A + [(2q   q1)(q3   q3A)1    q((1  )q3)1  ] (A.6)
and the rst-order conditions with respect to q1 and q3A imply that
q1
q3A
=
2q   q1
q3   q3A (=
q2
q3B
) (A.7)
This equality between consumption ratios for the two types of agents which
follows from the symmetry of their utility functions implies that
q2
2q
=
q3B
q3
(A.8)
Using  to denote the common value of these ratios, the constraint (A.3) can
be written
(2q) q1 3 = q
((1  )q3)1  (A.9)
Hence,
2 = (1  )1  (A.10)
and
q2
q1
=

1   =
2 (1  )1 
1  2 (1  )1  =
[2(1  )]1 
2  [2(1  )]1  (A.11)
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